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Abstract  
This thesis examines how British prime ministers have de-Europeanized the national identity 
through their discourse before and after the Brexit referendum – or in other words – how 
they turned away from the EU by using language. The research is conducted through a 
critical discourse analysis (CDA) of 25 speeches and statements by David Cameron and 
Theresa May. The timeframe begins when Cameron promised a referendum on EU 
membership in January 2013, and ends in October 2017, more than a year after the yes-
vote. The analysis reveals that British discourse on common security threats was not 
gradually de-Europeanized, but internationalised by May by constructing the UK as ‘Global 
Britain’. Language on migrants from the EU to the UK was already de-Europeanized before 
the Brexit referendum, and did not change significantly after the referendum. In fact, it 
gradually normalised after Cameron’s General Election victory in 2015. This study also 
reveals that both prime ministers could ‘cherry pick’ identities, meaning that they could 
choose between constructing a national, European, or even global identity to their liking per 
policy area.  
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the first questions in the Eurobarometer of 2015, a survey about the public opinion of 
the European Union, was “do you see yourself as a European citizen?” (TNS opinion & social 
2015, 21-22).1 In total, 60 percent of the EU-28 respondents declared that they feel like 
European citizens. Out of the respondents from the United Kingdom, 34 percent declared 
feeling like European citizens, a relatively low number.2 A great majority saw themselves as 
‘British only’. In any case, British citizens will probably not be asked the same question after 
March 2019, considering that their country will likely have left the EU by then (May 2017d).    
Academics have become increasingly interested in the connection between European 
integration and the feeling of being a European citizen in the past decade (M. Bruter 2005; 
Michael Bruter 2003; Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse-Kappen 2001; Fligstein, Polyakova, and 
Sandholtz 2012; Howarth and Torfing 2004; Robyn 2004). These academics adopted a 
constructivist approach, which is also used in this paper. Constructivism assumes that 
Europe and the EU are not fixed identities, but concepts that change over time and are 
subject to changing meanings. Nation states play a defining role in establishing their own 
position in relation to the EU, and are not simply static receivers of European integration 
(Richmond 2014). Existing literature logically contextualized their case studies in the context 
of how European integration progressed in the member states, and how this strengthened a 
common European identity (Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse-Kappen 2001; Michael Bruter 
2003; M. Bruter 2005; Breuer 2012; Coman, Kostera, and Tomini 2014; Michalski 2013; 
Majstorović 2007; Agnantopoulos 2010; Wong and Hill 2012; Risse 2009). The focus in this 
literature was how the EU acted as an international actor (see especially Larsen 2004), the 
‘Brusselization’ of member states, and the relation between a convergence of national 
policies among the EU member states and a growing sense of a common European identity 
(Wagner 2003, 576). For instance, Fligstein et al. concluded that those who participate 
actively in the EU are more likely to also feel European, compared to those whose economic 
and social horizons are essentially local (Fligstein, Polyakova, and Sandholtz 2012).  
                                                          
1 60 percent of the respondents defined themselves either as both citizens of primarily their nation and then 
Europe, primarily Europe and then their nation, or as European only.  
2 See footnote 1.  
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As the UK was negotiating how to leave the EU at the time this research was undertaken, a 
new phenomenon occurred in European integration studies. The UK was the state to leave 
the Union. Rather than European integration, European de-integration became a central 
topic in British politics after the Brexit referendum. Considering that the UK would leave the 
EU’s institutions, the major focus of academic studies have been how the country would de-
Europeanize in policy terms (Brakman, Garretsen, and Kohl 2017; Switzer and Hannan 
2017). But was the population’s feeling of belonging to a European identity also de-
Europeanized? The existing literature does not address this. This paper attempts to fill that 
gap and takes de-integration as a vantage point.   
This paper examines how David Cameron and Theresa May de-Europeanized the national 
identity through their discourse before and after the Brexit referendum. In other terms, it 
will reveal how they turned away from the EU through their language, but not in policy or 
institutional terms. The focus lies on British prime ministers (PMs) for two reasons. Not only 
can they influence the extent to which their nation commits to common European policies 
(Larsen 2004, 63), they also have a significant impact on identity shaping by either praising, 
ignoring or blaming the EU for what it has done. A popular strategy in this regard is the ‘Us 
versus Them’ divide, in which an imagined group of people is distinguished from an imagined 
‘Other’ (Machin and Mayr 2012, 77–79). In case of European integration studies, 
representing the nation as Self and the EU as Other in antithetical terms will weaken the 
creation of a European identity (Agnantopoulos 2010, 7). Such repeated usage of ‘we’ can 
define an identity, either by pointing to a common European community acting as an 
international actor, or rather to a separate nation state that is different from ‘the Others’. 
For instance, when David Cameron was obligated by the EU to open the UK’s borders for 
Syrian refugees, he said that the UK “created more jobs than the rest of the European 
Union” and frequently repeated that he was “proud of his nation” (BBC News 2015). In this 
case, the Us versus Them strategy was used to legitimize pursuing a different immigration 
policy from the EU’s. A somewhat comparable and more obvious case of identity 
deconstruction is found in Turkey. While not a member of the EU and therefore not prone to 
institutional de-Europeanization, PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan de-Europeanized his country’s 
identity by referring to the EU increasingly negatively since the 2011 elections (Aydın-Düzgit 
2016).     
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1.1 World-view, role conception and identity shaping through foreign policy  
An important area in which national identity can be shaped is in the world-view of the state’s 
foreign policy (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, 126). A world-view is a conception of how the 
world is or should be according to a state. Such a view is defined by a state’s history, 
geographical position and security situation. These views are different in each member state, 
because there is usually no common understanding of what type of foreign policy should be 
leading (Müller 2016). Each country also has a different role conception, which defines how 
a country sees itself (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, 127). For instance, the UK often presents 
itself as a promoter of human rights, the free market economy, and a special partner of the 
United States (May and Obama 2016). Constructivists assume that member states can rely 
on world-views and role conceptions in constructing their own identity (Keukeleire and 
Delreux 2014, 326–28). Because states have no ontological status, they construct their own 
identity by positioning themselves in relation to the Others through their foreign policy 
discourse (Messari 2001, 235; Aydın-Düzgit 2016, 46). The weakness of the EU is that it has 
no true common world-view or role conception. Instead, member states are responsible for 
the world-view and role conception of the EU. The EU therefore lacks a well-developed 
common and independent identity.3  
‘Europeanization’ is originally defined as the interaction between national foreign policies 
and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, 
129). The process can gradually change the world-view, norms and values, identity and role 
conception of nation-states and the EU (Ibid., 131). It can be separated in three distinct yet 
interrelated processes: 
                                                          
3 Admittedly, fruitful progress in harmonizing foreign policy came with the enforcement of the Treaty of Lisbon 
in 2009, which introduced a triple-hatted position: a single High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security, who also has a vice-presidential seat in the European Commission and chairs the Foreign Affairs 
Council (Nugent 2010, 380). But despite this major step towards better coordination, decisions on foreign 
policy must still be taken unanimously in the Council of Ministers. See Article 24 of the TEU: “The common 
foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by 
the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise”. There 
are some exceptions. For instance, a member state can abstain from the vote, and some decisions can be taken 
by qualified majority voting (QMV). However, the decision to request a vote by QMV must be taken by 
unanimity. See (“Decision Making in Common Foreign and Security Policy” n.d.).  
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• Firstly, as a top-down process, it refers to the changes in national foreign policy that 
are caused by participating in the EU’s foreign policy making, a process called 
downloading. 
• Secondly, as a bottom-up process, it is means the projection of national foreign 
policy ideas and models at the EU-level, defined as uploading.  
• Lastly, the first two aspects can redefine national interests and the feeling of identity 
as a consequence of Europeanization. The resulting process that may lead to a 
convergence in terms of policies and identity between the nation-state and the EU 
can be summarized in the term crossloading (Wong and Hill 2012, 4).  
Especially large and powerful member states such as the UK can upload their preferences 
and models to the EU institutions, and thus project their national policies on to the European 
level. The extent to which crossloading takes place in the member states has been a subject 
of several academic bundles and articles (Saurugger and Terpan 2015; Portela 2015; 
Pomorska and Vanhoonacker 2015; Wong and Hill 2012; Gross 2011; Balfour 2015).  
The UK is relatively less dependent on the EU compared to the other member states. Its 
diplomatic and military power allows policy exertion through a variety of other institutional 
framework groups (Lehne 2012), which will provide all the more useful once the country has 
left the EU. Examples are international organisations such as the United Nations and NATO, 
but also bilateral and unilateral channels. Especially NATO and bilateral relations with the US 
are popular alternatives. The outcome of these considerations ultimately decides to what 
extent there is a British commitment to European policies, and the degree of this 
commitment shapes the perception of the EU in the UK (Gross 2011, 13; Keukeleire and 
Delreux 2014, 126–27).  
 
1.2 De-Europeanization through foreign policy discourse  
By using the study of language as a methodology in two case studies (a method known as 
critical discourse analysis, elaborated in chapter two), three guiding questions on British 
foreign policy discourse in relation to the EU are adopted. These questions were identified 
by (Larsen 2004, 67–73) as main empirical discursive questions on EU foreign policy, and I 
have altered these to fit also national foreign policy:  
5 
 
• Is the UK or the EU constructed as an international actor? 
• What kind of international actor is constructed in relation to the other actor? 
• What kind of values is this international actor based on in relation to the other actor?  
These questions revolve around the main goal of this thesis, which is to illuminate how David 
Cameron and Theresa May de-Europeanized the national identity through their discourse. 
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on how dominant discourses can weaken the sense 
of feeling European in the nation states (Agnantopoulos 2010, 7). Furthermore, even though 
the UK will leave the EU, it may also reveal whether there is a common understanding of 
policies in shaping EU foreign policy, or rather an ongoing argument over every policy issue 
between the nation-states. The latter assumption lies closer to the realists’ view which 
assumes that the current state of play in Europe’s foreign policy is a lowest common 
denominator of the national views or national costs/benefit consideration (e.g. Gordon 
1998; Hyde-Price 2008). However, it is also possible that Europe is in some cases a unified 
actor, pursuing similar goals and common values (Larsen 2004, 68).  
Now that the main question and guiding questions are clear, the following chapter will 
discuss what critical discourse analysis exactly is and how it can be used to answer the 
research questions. Chapter three describes which specific data are used. Chapters four and 
five contain the actual case studies of several primary sources. Chapter six will conclude by a 
presentation of the findings, added by a discussion of shortcomings, and recommendations 
for further research.    
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2. Methodology & approach  
 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a method used to examine how power in social relations is 
present in texts (T. A. van Dijk 1993, 249). CDA sees language not as a simple form of 
communication, but as a tool that can change power relations and social constructions. 
Realities are shaped by the language that actors or institutions use, in opposition to the idea 
that language is just a projection of the status quo or a cover up of what is really happening 
(N. Fairclough and Wodak 2011, 258). For instance, in democratic societies it is believed that 
court judges have power to bring justice to society, but only because people think of judges 
as legitimate. The process of this legitimisation is for a major part created and expressed 
through language and other forms of communication (Machin and Mayr 2012, 24).  
In line of Michel Foucault’s findings, the father of discourse theory, an assumption of CDA is 
that those in stronger positions can create and formulate ideas and turn them into 
unquestioned truths or falsehoods, and consequentially shape social relations (Foucault, in 
Rabinow 1984). This is especially the case for politicians within powerful institutions of the 
state apparatus, because they have access to state information, speak for the whole 
population, have constitutional legitimacy, and have privileged access to the media (Weldes 
et al. 1999, 17–18). CDA is therefore a suitable method in analysing identity shaping by 
British PMs (Larsen 2004, 62).  
Besides CDA, there exist many other disciplinary, theoretical and methodical approaches in 
discourse analysis within International Relations. To describe all of them here would not fit 
the length and purpose of this research, and has been done extensively elsewhere (Carta 
and Morin 2014, 27–30). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the term ‘discourse’ is 
interpreted differently. Some scholars use the term narrowly, clarifying that a discourse in 
linguistics is “a stretch of language, larger than the sentence” (Bullock and Stallybrass 1977, 
175, in Carta and Morin, 3), while others use it broadly and say that “there is nothing 
outside discourse” (Campbell 2005, 4). Schneider summarizes different interpretations by 
quoting some authors in the field of discourse analysis (Schneider 2013a): 
“the use of language” (Chilton 2004, 16); 
“anything written or said or communicated using signs” (Fillingham 2007, 100); 
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“the flow of knowledge through time” (Jäger 2004, 129, translated by Schneider); 
“talk and texts as parts of social practice” (Potter 1996, 105); 
“social cognitions, socially specific ways of knowing social practices” (Leeuwen 2008, 6). 
Whether discourse is interpreted narrowly or broadly, all these theories take human 
expression as a vantage point and link this to human knowledge. The things that people say 
or write flow back and forth in society, and this process redefines what generally accepted 
knowledge is. What society holds true over time therefore changes, and as said before, some 
people have a stronger position to define what is true than others (Schneider 2013a).  
 
2.1 The discourse-historical approach and identity construction 
One of the major variants of CDA is the discourse-historical approach (DHA), founded by the 
influential political discourse analyst Ruth Wodak (2009). In this approach, politics are 
divided in fields of action such as law making, public opinion, international relations, political 
administration, etcetera. Each of these fields are again divided in sub-genres, leading to a 
specialised view of political discourse (I. Fairclough and Fairclough 2013). The word 
‘historical’ in the discourse-historical approach means that social and political backgrounds 
of a text are integrated in the analysis. Intertextuality and interdiscursivity are central in the 
approach, although the two differ. Intertextuality is the shaping of one text by another text, 
while interdiscursivity means that discourses can be connected to and draw from one 
another in a broader sense (Aydın-Düzgit 2014, 137). Intertextuality and interdiscursivity are 
underlying concepts in the case studies, because the primary sources are compared in their 
degree of de-Europeanization.  
The reason why DHA was chosen as the approach of this research is because of its emphasis 
on identity construction, taking the discursive construction of ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ as the basis 
of discourses related to identity and difference. Discourses can “(…) serve to construct 
collective subjects” (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 40). Within the CDA approach on European 
integration studies, DHA has been used most often as a way of analysing identity 
construction and how this plays through at the national level of the member states (Wodak 
et al. 2009; Krzyżanowski 2010; Krzyżanowski and Oberhuber 2007; Krzyżanowski, 
Triandafyllidou, and Wodak 2009; Wodak 2009).  
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In applying DHA, I will adapt the three steps as summarized by Aydın-Düzgit (2014, 137). 
These are as following: 
1. Outlining the main themes and discourses, also called the discourse topics (Van Dijk 
1984, 56). 
2. Exploring the discursive strategies deployed in the discourse topics (Reisigl and 
Wodak 2001, 44).  
3. Exploring the linguistic means that are used to realise these discursive strategies.  
The three-step analysis offers a useful approach in studying both macro and micro aspects of 
discourse, as rightly pointed out by Aydın-Düzgit (2014, 138). The first step will be addressed 
in the next chapter, which outlines the discourse topics and limits the analysis to a set of 
actors and political processes and events. These limitations are necessary for the scope of 
this study and the actual analysis of discourse strategies in chapters four and five. 
Steps two and three are used throughout the case studies in chapters four and five. In 
following these steps, I will use the practical guide of Machin and Mayr (2012). Their book 
extensively explains how to analyse semiotic choices in discourse, how verbs and specific 
language features can be used, what representational strategies exist, how metaphor and 
rhetoric are used, and what hedging and modality are.  
Now that the methodology of this paper is clear, I will specify what data are used in this 
study, what the discourse topics are, and in which timeframe these are situated.  
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3. Data selection 
 
The data subject to analysis are a total number of 25 documents. These consist of 23 public 
speeches and press conferences, 15 of which were followed by a Q&A session, and 2 letters. 
Jäger calls these sources discourse fragments (see table 1) (Jäger 2001, 25). PMs David 
Cameron and Theresa May are the key actors, the reasons for which were already explained 
in the first chapter.4 It would have been possible to also study the discourse of other 
prominent politicians, such as the Secretaries of State. But in the UK, the PM stands on top 
of the strongly hierarchical pattern within foreign policy decision-making (Keukeleire and 
Delreux 2014, 117). On top of that, the unity between British ministries and officials in 
communicating policies is also exceptionally high, leading to similar discourses among these 
functionaries and the PM (Ibid.).       
Public speeches and statements are the most important aspects of the research, because 
they meet Hansen’s three criteria of having high political authority, articulating both identity 
and politics, and reaching a wide audience (Hansen 2006, 82–87). The benefit of Q&A 
sessions is that the narratives and orientations of the speakers are revealed. This is so 
because interviewees will more easily reveal their identities by speaking of their experiences 
to the interviewer, and because the dialogical and informal nature of an interview can let the 
interviewee reveal its own take on constructed identities (Aydın-Düzgit, 139). The 
combination between formal speeches and informal Q&A sessions is a measure to prevent a 
one-sided discourse analysis, caused by for instance the monotony of the speech writer or 
the subjectivity of the interviewer. It also provides a comparative aspect in the research and 
can possibly bring to light (dis)similarities in discourses through different formal and informal 
genres and settings.  
The discourse topics of these primary sources are migration from the EU to the UK and 
foreign policy towards Russia. There will also be a brief discussion of the construction of a 
Global Britain identity, used by Theresa May to legitimize distancing her government from 
the EU’s policies in general. The reason for choosing migration and Russia as discourse topics 
is that these are controversial and relatively non-controversial respectively in the in the EU, 
                                                          
4 See page 2. 
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in British society and among British politicians. One of the main reasons why a majority of 
the British population voted in favour of Brexit is because of concerns about migration 
(Clarke and Goodwin 2017). A poll held in January 2016 revealed that some 46 percent of 
the British public found that migration in general was the most important issue facing Britain 
(Ipsos MORI 2016). Similar concerns were raised in other member states, although mostly 
on non-EU immigration (Pardijs 2016). On the other hand, the UK and almost all EU member 
states agreed that Russia should be sanctioned to some extent (Ibid.)5. This was a result of 
Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea in February 2014. While a group of parties that 
challenge the establishment are increasingly accommodating themselves with Moscow, 
there is still a broad consensus in the EU that sanctions should not be uplifted (Council of 
the EU 2017)6. Although no statistics of the British population’s view of Russia exist to my 
knowledge, the British government remained committed to taking a tough stance on Russia 
even after the Brexit vote (King 2016).  
Because the hypotheses are formulated in a way that discourse over a longer period is 
analysed, diachronic analysis is used: a reflection of how discourse changed over time 
(Schneider 2013b).  
Actors Prime Ministers David Cameron and 
Theresa May. 
Discourse topics Diplomatic measures against Russia, EU 
migration to the United Kingdom, Britain as 
an internationalist nation.  
Discourse fragments 23 public speeches and press conferences, 
15 of which followed by Q&A sessions, and 
2 letters. 
Time frame January 2013 – November 2017.  
Analysation type Diachronic analysis. 
Table 1 – Critical discourse analysis approach  
                                                          
5 The survey was conducted in all 28 member states, asking representatives of 74 political parties about their 
foreign policy priorities after the Brexit vote.  
6 On 28 June 2017, the Council unanimously decided to extended restrictions on economic relations with Russia 
for six months.  
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The next two chapters will turn to the results of the conducted CDA, and use the above data 
to show how Cameron and May de-Europeanized the national identity through their 
discourse.  
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4. British discourse on EU migration 
 
The first section of this chapter analyses David Cameron’s political language on migration 
from the EU to the UK between 2013 and 2016. Considering that such an analysis has 
already been done by Ágopcsa (2017), I will use her findings as a background to my case 
study of a single transcript. The second section is a study of Theresa May’s discourse on EU 
migration since her election in July 2016, based on 10 transcripts. These are compared to 
Cameron’s discourse on post-Brexit differences in the conclusion. Notable excerpts are 
analysed step-by-step to reveal in the clearest way possible the discursive strategies that 
were used.  
 
4.1 Case study: David Cameron’s discourse on EU migration  
Although partly outside of the timeframe of this research, it is important to note that 
Cameron neglected the importance of EU migration before 2014. According to Ágopcsa 
(2017, 18), he only referred to the issue of non-EU migration in his speeches from 2010 until 
2013 (the Cameron-Clegg coalition governed between 2010 and 2015). His migration policies 
were heavily criticised by Eurosceptics. Politicians, the press, and later the wider population 
blamed the PM for outsourcing border control to the EU. The United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP), a party favouring the UK’s departure of the EU, gained 13 percent of the votes 
in the seats it was contesting in the local elections of 2012. On January 2013, as a response 
to rising Euroscepticism and in an attempt to attract UKIP voters to the Conservative Party, 
Cameron promised a referendum on EU membership if he was re-elected in 2015 (Ágopcsa 
2017, 18-19).  
However, even after the referendum was promised, voting intention for UKIP grew stronger, 
whose electorate desired national control over both EU and non-EU migration. This limited 
Cameron’s aim to maintain a positive image of EU migration, and forced him to use a more 
negative tone. He pleaded for a need to reform EU migration to the UK for the first time 
during a major speech in March 2013. In this speech and the ones up to 2015, he politicized 
EU migrants as a threat and a security issue – known as securitization within International 
Relations (Stritzel 2007). EU migrants were deemed to be Others who pressured British 
identity and social welfare. With migration figures increasing, the strategy gradually changed 
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from securitizing ‘unfair’ migration to securitizing migration to the UK in general. (Ágopcsa 
2017, 18-21). At a Conservative Party conference in October 2014, Cameron pledged that 
migration would become his main negotiating topic with the EU.   
The speech below dates from 28 November 2014, and was held in Rocester, Staffordshire 
(Cameron 2014f). It was the last time Cameron politicized EU migration (Ágopcsa 2017, 8). 
After the speech, he refrained from further politicising EU migration. He turned to the 
success of his economic policies in the run-up to the 2015 General Election, and avoided 
questions on migration. After the Conservative Party’s election victory in May 2015, he 
avoided the topic altogether. The Staffordshire speech discussed below was held six months 
prior to the election, when voting intention for UKIP was still high (Ipsos MORI 2017). It is 
merely a snapshot of Cameron’s negative discourse on EU migration.  
 
Construction of the international actor 
In the beginning of his speech, Cameron acknowledges that immigration is in principal 
beneficial to Britain, on the conditions that it is controlled, fair, and in conformity with the 
UK’s national interests (Cameron 2014f):  
(…) Immigration benefits Britain, but it needs to be controlled, it needs to be fair, and 
it needs to be centred around our national interest. 
Cameron then turns to migration from within the EU. He starts off by praising the general 
benefits European migration brings, and constructs the identity of a ‘good’ migrant. He 
begins with (Ibid.):  
(…) let me be clear.  
‘Let me be clear’ is a presupposition, a way of presenting an idea as taken for granted when 
it may be contestable (Machin and Mayr 2012, 153). It is then sketched out is that it is an 
obvious fact that the “great majority” of migrants are not moving with the sole goal of 
benefiting from the British welfare system. It is not clear how many people that great 
majority consists of. Instead, it is said twice that this group “works hard”, followed by an 
assurance that they pay taxes and therefore contribute to the country (Cameron 2014f): 
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(…) [The migrants] work, work hard, and they pay their taxes. They contribute to our 
country.   
This is an apologetic introduction to what follows in his speech, in which he describes the 
many negative consequences that ‘bad’ migrants bring along. The good migrant is described 
at the start of his speech, and is characterized as a person who not only works hard and pays 
his taxes, but also has a family (Ibid.):  
(…)[They are] in search of a better life for them and their families. 
The good migrant not only searches a better life for himself, but also for his or her family. 
This is again a presupposition, in which the audience is made to believe that the good 
migrant always has a family. How they travel to Britain is framed by using a rhetorical 
hyperbole, or exaggeration (Machin and Mayr 2012, 170; Cameron 2014f): 
They’re willing to travel across the continent.  
The above sentence makes it seem as if migrant families endure an arduous trip from the far 
south-eastern point of the continent to the north-west, ultimately ending up in Britain. The 
trip is metaphorically constructed as a long journey. From most European countries 
however, Britain is reachable by plane within a few hours for less than a couple of hundred 
euros.  
Finally, the good migrant does not stay forever (Cameron 2014f): 
Many of them come for just a short period, a year or two before then returning 
home. 
In sum, the good migrant is one with a family, works hard, and leaves within a couple of 
years. Britain is the nation which can benefit from migration, but also the international actor 
which should keep migration “controlled” and “fair”. 
 
Type of international actor in relation to the other actor 
With Britain constructed as an independent international actor, and a short 
acknowledgement of why ‘fair’ migration in principle may be good, the speech turns to the 
negative consequences. The problem according to Cameron is twofold: the high number of 
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migrants and the abuse of the British welfare system that some migrants are accused of. I 
will start with the first issue. The first paragraph directly anonymizes and aggregates the 
migrants (Ibid.):  
In some areas, the number of migrants we’re seeing is far higher than our local 
authorities, our schools and our hospitals can cope with.  
Migrants are not called “skilled workers” or “best talent” as earlier on in the speech, but are 
treated as a statistic, described as a “number” too large for local authorities to cope with. 
This has an ideological effect. By framing EU migrants as a number that threatens the 
foundation of British public services, it becomes a dangerous and different group.  
The next part takes a notable turn. Whereas Cameron has up until now constructed a British 
type of actor, for example by referring to “British history”, “our creativity” and “our values”, 
he now refers to a common European history. He starts with the following sentence (Ibid.):  
They’re [migration numbers are] much higher than anything the EU has known 
before in its history. 
Migration to the UK is put into the broader context of European migration history. The 
hedging strategy is used here, which means that Cameron avoids directness while appearing 
to be precise and detailed (Machin and Mayr 2012, 192). He does so by using the 
comparative adverbs “much” and “than”. Frankly, Cameron does not specify how high the 
migration numbers to Britain are compared to earlier periods in the EU. In fact, while he 
keeps referring to disrupting numbers of migration, in the entire speech he never specifically 
mentions how many migrants came to Britain. He appears to do so in the next paragraph 
(Cameron 2014f): 
One million people coming to 1 member state (…). 
But in what time span these people came to Britain is not mentioned. According to a study 
from 2010 by the Migration Policy Institute, an estimated 1.5 million people entered the UK 
between 2004 and 2009 (Doward and Rogers 2010). Some 700.000 stayed permanently, the 
rest were mostly temporary workers who saved money and then returned home. Therefore, 
around 700.000 migrants settled in the UK in 5 years. Leaving aside the discussion of 
whether this is a high number, the fact that Cameron speaks of “one million” migrants 
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without any contextualization is a strong indication that he purposefully conceals precise 
numbers to make migration levels seem worse than they are. He also conceals the fact that 
five years earlier, during the 2010 election, he made a similar pledge as in this speech of 
reducing migration numbers to “tens of thousands a year” (“INVITATION TO JOIN THE 
GOVERNMENT OF BRITAIN - The Conservative Manifesto 2010” 2010, 21).   
A similar reference to European history is made in the following sentence. Comparative 
adverbs are used, followed by a presupposition, which means that untrue or contestable 
ideas are taken for granted (Machin and Mayr 2012, 153–62; Cameron 2014f):  
They’re [migration numbers are] far higher than what the founding fathers envisaged 
when the European Economic Community was established in 1957 or what Margaret 
Thatcher and Helmut Kohl envisaged when they signed the Single European Act in 
1986. 
The eleven founding fathers never envisaged a limit to the number of migrants. On the 
contrary, they laid down the freedom of movement for workers and planned future 
European integration in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 (Judt 2006, 303). Moreover, the Single 
European Act (SEA) was meant to add new momentum to the process of European 
integration. This process would eventually lead to the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 
1992 and several Schengen Agreements, which gradually phased out the existence of 
internal borders in the EU (Marzocchi 2017). Given that Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl 
agreed to establish a common market and abolish internal borders by signing the SEA, it 
makes little sense to state that they did not envisage a spike in migration numbers. Yet 
Cameron uses these historical figures and the founding fathers, who were both vital in 
improving European integration, to strengthen his national anti-migration vision.  
The second issue is pressure on social security, and is also used to construct a view of 
migrants who are generally abusive and a threat to the national social welfare system 
(Cameron 2014f):   
So many people, so fast is placing real burdens on our public services. There are 
secondary schools where the turnover of pupils can be as high as 1 third of the whole 
school inside a year. There are primary schools where dozens of languages are 
spoken, with only a small minority speaking English as their first language. There are 
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hospitals where maternity units are under great pressure because birth rates have 
increased dramatically. There are accident and emergency departments, as we know, 
under serious pressure. There’s pressure on social housing that can’t be met.  
There are a couple of issues mentioned here: pressure on public services, low pupil turnover, 
pressure on hospitals and emergency services, and pressure on social housing. Indeed, the 
population size has grown massively in the UK since the 1990s, and most of this growth was 
caused by migration. Net migration (the difference between the number of immigrants and 
the number of emigrants) increased the population size by more than 250.000 people per 
year from 2004 to 2015, which was approximately 50.000 more than the yearly natural 
growth per year for that period (Khomami 2017). A larger population naturally implies that 
more doctors are needed, and more houses need to be built. Pressure on hospitals or an 
increase in housing prices can otherwise be the consequence.  
But Cameron does not blame these problems on population growth. Instead, migrants are 
blamed collectively as a group who cause the pressure on social benefits and public services. 
They are the ones who have come to pick the fruits of the British welfare system (Cameron 
2014f):  
And all this in a country with a generous non-contributory welfare system. All of this 
is raising real issues of fairness. 
Cameron could have acknowledged that the British welfare system has had a hard time 
keeping up with population growth in general. Instead, by “raising real issues of fairness”, he 
hints to the idea that migrants who benefit from the British welfare system are unfair. But 
according to research, 60 percent of the migrants who entered the UK from Central and 
Eastern European countries were less likely to claim benefits than natives who receive state 
benefits or tax credits, and 58 percent less likely to live in social housing between 2004 and 
2009. Also, these migrants made a positive contribution to public finance since the EU 
enlargement in 2004. This is because relatively more of them participated in the labour 
force, paid more indirect taxes, and made less use of benefits and public services 
(Dustmann, Frattini, and Halls 2009).  
Despite research suggesting that migrants bring more fiscal benefits than costs, Cameron 
proposes that they should live with less rights compared to those born in Britain. He goes a 
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step further than the Us versus Them division, because he suggests that the constructed 
‘Others’ are undeserving, second-class citizens (Cameron 2014f):  
This is about saying our welfare system, in a way, should be like a national club. It’s 
made up of the contributions of hardworking British taxpayers, millions of people 
doing the right thing, paying into the system, generation after generation. It cannot 
be right that migrants can turn up and claim full rights to this club straight away. 
So let’s be clear what all these changes taken together will mean. EU migrants should 
have a job offer before they come here. UK taxpayers will not support them if they 
don’t. And once they’re in work, they won’t get benefits or social housing from 
Britain unless they’ve been here for at least 4 years. Yes, these are radical reforms, 
but they are also reasonable and fair. (…).  
An Us versus Them construct is created by representing the welfare system as “ours”, and by 
distinguishing UK taxpayers, who are “doing the right thing”, from EU migrants. Rather than 
recognizing the millions of pounds migrants have contributed to it, the welfare system is 
described as a metaphorical national club made up of contributions by “British” taxpayers. 
Migrants are collectivized as a group that turns up and takes away from this club. The irony 
in this is that many UK taxpayers are in fact EU migrants, and that some 58 percent of EU job 
seekers already had a job offer before even entering the UK  in the end of 2014 (“Migration 
Statistics Quarterly Report” 2014). Yet Cameron suggests that new EU migrants are not 
supposed to receive benefits or social housing “from Britain”. The issue of fairness is again 
raised – granting EU migrants less rights to benefits is necessary to protect the British 
population. Again ironically, the British population is largely made up by a diverse ethnic 
population originating from different countries, including migrants from the EU.  
 
Values of the international actor in relation to the other 
Britain is depicted as a nation that has a lot of characteristics to be proud of, historically as 
well as in the present. This pride is based on the success of the multiracial democracy, where 
people from different backgrounds have worked together on building a common home 
(Cameron 2014f): 
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When I think about what makes me proud to be British, yes, it’s our history, our 
values, our creativity, our compassion. But there is something else too. I am 
extremely proud that together we have built a successful, multi racial democracy. A 
country where, in 1 or 2 generations, people can come with nothing, and rise as high 
as their talent allows. A country whose success has been founded not on building 
separate futures, but rather on coming together to build a common home. 
(…) Our openness is part of who we are. We should celebrate it. We should never 
allow anyone to demonise it. And we must never give in to those who would throw 
away our values with the appalling prospect of repatriating migrants who are here 
totally legally and have lived here for years. We are Great Britain because of 
immigration, not in spite of it.  
Most of the above paragraph is vague and meaningless. Is Cameron proud of Britain’s history 
in which it colonized a large part of the world, or its liberation of Europe from Nazi 
Germany? What does openness mean when a nation tries to restrict migration to the rich or 
highly skilled? And why does he make a plea to not throw away “our values” in repatriating 
migrants who reside legally in the UK, while at the same time trying to restrict legal EU 
migration?   
The construction of good British values makes Cameron’s discourse on restricting EU 
migration seem as less drastic than it otherwise would. It allows for an Us versus Them 
depiction, in which the UK’s population opposes the influx of ‘bad’ migrants. It is British 
values and history that make Cameron proud, not those of Europe. The construction of 
European values would have made EU migrants part of British society and culture. By 
referring to separate Britain values, it is suggested that the British people are indeed a 
distinguished kind of people from the rest of Europe. But by constructing Britain as an open 
and tolerant nation while also pleading for restricted legal EU migration, the idea of what 
Britain’s open and tolerant values are remains vague. 
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4.2 Case Study: Theresa May’s discourse on EU migration  
Construction of the international actor 
The international actor constructed post-Brexit is ambiguous in the studied texts. Take for 
instance the following Q&A session after a press conference with German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel on 20 July 2016, shortly after May’s appointment as PM, in which the UK is framed as 
an independent international actor (May and Merkel 2016):  
[the British people] wanted to see control brought into the movement of people from 
the European Union into the United Kingdom. (…) we as a government will deliver on 
[the issue of free movement] for people. 
Here it is emphasized that the British leave-voters wanted to see its own government regain 
control over its borders, without the interference of other states. “The European Union” is 
already described as something different than “the United Kingdom”, even though the UK 
was still a member state of the EU in 2016. Notably, the idea that the UK will decide on 
migration policy with disregard of the rest is quickly dropped by May (Ibid.): 
(…) we have 2 women here who (…) want to deliver the best possible results for the 
people of the UK and the people of Germany.  
This ambiguity continues throughout all the other texts. After a joint press statement with 
Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło one week later, May responded to a question on Polish 
citizen’s rights (May and Szydło 2016a):  
While we are members of the EU, there will be no change for Polish citizens [in the 
UK].  
Followed by a statement on their rights after the UK leaves the EU (Ibid.): 
As regards to the future, it is a very clear message that has come from the vote of the 
British people, that they don’t want free movement to continue the way that it has 
been in the past, and that they do want some control in relation to free movement. 
That, of course, will be one of the issues that we will be looking at in the negotiation 
that we take forward.  
The UK will still act together with Poland in resolving the “issue” of freedom of movement. 
Interestingly, “The British people” are giving a mandate in restricting free movement to the 
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UK. This is a synecdoche – in which a part represents the whole - where the government acts 
on its own behalf without the EU by the virtue of the democratic decision of the British 
people (Machin and Mayr 2012, 172). In this case, the government is legitimized to 
implement stricter border controls. This kind of discourse is a consequence of the future de-
Europeanization of British policies on migration.  
A few months later, May took a slightly different stance on the UK as an international actor 
(May and Szydło 2016b): 
I have also reiterated my plan to guarantee the rights of Poles (…). And I hope we can 
reach an early agreement on this issue.  
The synecdoche of acting on behalf of the British people is left out here, and instead the 
rights of Poles are guaranteed under “my plan”, making May herself the international actor. 
A similar discourse was adapted during a Q&A session with the Italian PM Paolo Gentiloni 
(May and Paolo 2017): 
(…) as a UK Prime Minister, I must, of course, also think of the UK citizens who are 
living in what would be the 27 remaining states of the EU.  
In the House of Commons, references to the UK as an international actor are usually 
stronger. For instance, in December 2016 May said (May 2016):  
(…) a deal will mean that when it comes to decision about our national interest, such 
as how we control immigration, we can make these decision for ourselves. And a deal 
that will mean our laws are once again made in Britain, not in Brussels.  
The EU is referred to with the negative noun “Brussels”. But even in cases where national 
interests are described as the utmost concern, there is always a notion that the rest of the 
EU should also cooperate as an international actor (Ibid.): 
I welcomed (…) the discussion between the 27 other leaders on their own plans for 
the UK’s withdrawal.  
22 
 
The UK was turned into a more independent international actor in May’s discourse during 
and after her Plan for Britain speech of 17 January 2017. The Plan was interpreted by many 
EU leaders as a strategy for a ‘hard Brexit’ (Asthana, Stewart, and Elgot 2017). In the speech, 
she said (May 2017a): 
Fairness demands that we deal with (…) [the rights of EU citizens who are already 
living in Britain, and the rights of British nationals in other member states] as soon as 
possible too (…). I have told other EU leaders that we could give people the certainty 
they want straight away, and reach such a deal now.  
By using the word “demands”, the importance of citizens’ rights is prioritized. Stating that a 
deal should be reached as soon as possible and that the UK can already do so “straight 
away”, May indirectly blames the other EU leaders for not having a plan. By doing so, the UK 
is depicted as an international leader which is on the forefront of the Brexit negotiations, 
compared to its slow or unwilling EU counterpart. A similarly strong rhetoric is used in a 
speech to the Parliament two months later (May 2017b): 
[We will] forge a new relationship with Europe (..). We will be a strong, self-governing 
Global Britain with control once again over our borders and our laws.  
A surprising turn in the interpretation of international leadership is found in May’s open 
letter to EU citizens living in the UK. The letter was written in October 2017, more than a 
year after the Brexit vote. It was written ahead of an EU Council meeting (May 2017e): 
As I travel to Brussels today, I know that many people will be looking to us – the 
leaders of the 28 nations in the European Union (…)  
“Many people” are not looking solely to the UK, but to “us” – all leaders of the EU. It is 
notable that this group consists of “28 nations”, rather than 27 nations without the UK. 
Instead of representing the UK as a different actor, it becomes a mix with the EU more 
strongly than before. Such rhetoric is found in the whole letter: 
(…) my fellow leaders have the same objective: to safeguard to rights of EU nationals 
living in the UK and UK nationals living in the EU. (…) we are united on the key 
principles.  
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Why is there a turn to mixed leadership in the letter? The answer probably lies in the 
assumption that it was as a form of appeasement to the leaders of the other 27 member 
states (O’Carroll 2017). The Brexit talks had long been in a very difficult stage, and were 
stuck at the time the open letter was published (Herszenhorn and Cooper 2017). Isolating 
the British government from the EU by hinging on the hard Brexit rhetoric would have 
further slowed the progress of the negotiations, as they indeed did after the Plan for Britain 
where a hard Brexit was first proposed by May (May 2017a). It was therefore politically 
wiser to construct an international actor as a mix between the UK and the EU. This ambiguity 
was also found in bilateral speeches with the leaders of Poland and Germany as shown 
above, but was less strong in national speeches and statements.  
 
Type of international actor in relation to the other  
May’s discourse on the type of the international actor is shaped by three characteristics, 
each constructing the UK’s identity in relation to the EU differently. These are Britain as a 
trading nation, Britain as a country open to EU migration, and Britain as a fair negotiator in 
the Brexit process.  
I will start with the first description: Britain as a trading nation. There were frequent 
references to free trade after the Brexit referendum. In a joint press conference with 
Chancellor Angela Merkel in July 2016, May said shortly after her appointment as a PM (May 
and Merkel 2016):  
Here in Germany, there are 1,300 British companies employing more than 220,000 
people.  
After the speech, a person from the audience asked whether the UK should swap prosperity 
for migration control. May responded: 
[The British people] want us to ensure that we can have some control on the 
movement of people from the EU into the UK in future [sic], but we also want to get 
the right deal on trade in goods and services.  
May suggests that there is no need to fully swap prosperity for migration control. Instead, 
there can be a good trade deal, while simultaneously exercising “some control” over who is 
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moving into the country. By framing migration as positive when it stimulates trade, without 
mentioning for instance unemployed migrants, migration is depicted as something good 
provided that it benefits the British economy. A similar discourse is found a joint speech with 
Beata Szydło, the Polish PM. May said that the UK values to contribution of Polish citizens 
who “work and live” in the UK, and immediately afterwards links this contribution to strong 
trading relations (May and Szydło 2016a): 
Last year, the UK was Poland’s second largest trading partner, and UK exports to 
Poland were worth more than £3 billion pounds.  
What is concealed in the above excerpt is the fact that British trade with Poland was so 
intense by the virtue of the EU’s four freedoms, which among other rights guarantee the 
free movement of people. I am not arguing that the UK would not be able to trade with the 
Poland intensely after leaving the EU. I merely argue that freedom of movement and anti-
protectionist measures stimulated trade within the EU significantly. This is hinted to by May 
herself when referring to the 1,300 British businesses operating in Germany, the number of 
which is apparently high because their owners were able to migrate to Germany so easily in 
the first place. A day after the joint address with the Polish PM, EU leaders decided that the 
UK could not have access to the single market without guaranteeing full free movement of 
people (James and Taylor 2016). The conflicting interest of maintaining free trade while 
controlling the free movement of people is not recognized as such. Instead, May is confident 
that there can be free trade without adhering to the EU’s four freedoms. In a major speech 
in Florence on 22 September 2017, she said (May 2017c):   
(…) we understand that the single market’s four freedoms are indivisible for our 
European friends. (…) let us be creative as well as practical in designing an ambitious 
economic partnership which respects the freedoms and principles of the EU, and the 
wishes of the British people.  
Words such as “creative”, “practical”, “designing”, “ambitious”, “principles”, and “wishes” 
are an overlexicalization of suggesting deliberate and energetic action, while the actual 
action that will be undertaken remains vague. These words suggest a degree of uncertainty 
from May (Machin and Mayr 2012, 37–38). Indeed, the Florence speech was held more than 
a year after the Brexit referendum, and both UK and EU leaders still had little idea what the 
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future of EU-UK trading relations would look like (Rankin and Boffey 2017). Nevertheless, 
positivity remains part of May’s discourse on migration and trade, even in times when 
negotiations were progressing slowly.  
The portrayal of Britain as an open trading nation is connected to the second characteristic: 
the UK as a nation open to EU migrants who benefit the economy. This characteristic was 
also present in Cameron’s discourse, who had a preference for highly-skilled and working 
people. In a speech with Beata Szydło in November 2016, May praised the Polish people 
(May and Szydło 2016a): 
Just now, we welcomed members of the Polish community here to Downing Street 
and paid tribute to the significant contribution they make to our nation (…).  
At the same time, there is a preference for Polish migrants who “live and work” there, and 
thereby contribute to the economy: 
(…) we value the contribution that has been made to the United Kingdom from Polish 
citizens who have come to live and work in the UK.   
Throughout her rather short speech and in the Q&A session, May repeats the notion that 
“we recognise the contribution that Polish citizens have made to the UK” three times. This 
praise is later directed at other EU nationals in her open letter, and part of the government’s 
good intentions (May 2017e): 
We want people to stay and we want families to stay together. We hugely value the 
contributions that EU nationals make to the economic, social and cultural fabric of 
the UK.  
May’s discourse on migrants is generally more positive than Cameron’s, at least compared to 
the period when his party was doing bad in the polls. Take for instance the following excerpt 
from his Staffordshire speech (Cameron 2014f): 
[Our welfare system is] made up of the contributions of hardworking British 
taxpayers, millions of people doing the right thing, paying into the system, generation 
after generation. It cannot be right that migrants can turn up and claim full rights to 
this club straight away. 
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May constructs no similar ‘bad migrants’ in any of her speeches. In her open letter of 
October 2017, she says that EU citizens who paid into the UK system can benefit from what 
they’ve put in (May 2017e). But nothing is mentioned about how of EU migrants would be 
getting different rights, and many concessions towards EU citizens are done in the rest of the 
letter. In the other documents, citizens from the other 27 member states are treated as 
equals, on the condition that the rights of British citizens living in the rest of the EU are 
guaranteed. The objective of the negotiations was to reassure these rights early on and 
protect both parties, as stated in the House of Commons earlier (May 2016): 
(…) it remains my objective that we give reassurance early on in the negotiations to 
EU citizens in the UK, and UK citizens living in EU countries, that their right to stay 
where they have made their homes will be protected by our withdrawal.  
The only way EU migration is framed as something negative in the studied documents is 
when high levels of net migration are discussed. May said a high number of migrants caused 
pressure on public services in her Plan for Britain speech, which was received as a plan for a 
hard Brexit by the EU (Asthana, Stewart, and Elgot 2017). But this was purely to argue in 
favour of a reduction in the number of people coming to the UK, rather than highlighting bad 
migration or pointing to migrants who claim social benefits without ‘contributing’ to society. 
References to controlled migration and its benefits were found over and over in the Plan for 
Britain speech, and also ubiquitous in all the other studied documents (May 2017a): 
We will continue to attract the brightest and the best to work or study in Britain.  
Controlled immigration can bring great benefits. 
We will always want immigration, especially high-skilled immigration. 
(…) we will always welcome individual migrants as friends. 
 (…) we will ensure we can control immigration to Britain from Europe. 
(…) that process [of immigration] must be managed properly so that out immigration 
system serves the national interest.  
So we will get control of the number of people coming to Britain from the EU.  
(…) controlled immigration can bring great benefits.  
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Brexit must mean control of the number of people who come to Britain from Europe.  
A third characteristic of May’s migration discourse is that Britain will act as a “fair” 
negotiator in the Brexit talks. Such fairness should apply to Europeans as well:  
We want to guarantee the rights of EU citizens who are already living in Britain, and 
the rights of British nationals in other member states (…). Because it is the right and 
fair thing to do.  
(…) a fairer Britain is a country that protects and enhances the rights people have at 
work. (…). Indeed, under my leadership, not only will the government protect the 
rights of workers set out in European legislation, we will build on them.  
Importantly, workers’ rights are guaranteed by copying European legislation into domestic 
regulations. However, fairness is again only promised if the EU also guarantees the rights of 
UK citizens living there (Ibid.): 
(…) I want and expect to be able to guarantee their rights in the UK. The only 
circumstances in which that would not be possible would be if the rights of British 
citizens living across the EU were not guaranteed.  
The UK is presented as a “fair” nation, but at the same time as a strong independent one 
that would only be satisfied with a win-win deal on migration. Similarly, in the open letter to 
EU citizens living in the UK, May promised to put EU citizens’ rights on her priority list in the 
negotiations (May 2017e). Considering the letter was written as late as October 2017, one 
may doubt whether citizens’ rights had the same priority in policy terms as in May’s 
discourse.  
 
Values of the international actor in relation to the other  
There are only rare references to shared or different values. While almost all studied 
documents start with a reference to shared values, these are almost always linked to 
security and defence cooperation, not to migration from the EU. This relation will be shown 
in the next chapter. In the context of migration, one reference is in May’s Plan for Britain 
speech where she describes Britain as an “open and tolerant” country (May 2017a). A 
reference to shared values was made just once. This was in a response to a question about 
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the reciprocity of citizens’ rights. But the response was linked to Britain’s and Europe’s 
common safety and security strategy (May and Szydło 2016b):  
We have a shared history, (…), we were able this morning to recognise those many 
Polish men and women who sacrificed their lives to help keep us safe and secure 
here in the United Kingdom, as well as Europe safe and secure. And we recognise 
that and there is much that we share in our values (…).  
 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the nature of Cameron’s and May’s discourse on EU migration. It 
revealed that although both PMs used the topic to de-Europeanize the national identity, this 
was not done gradually in the run up to and after the Brexit referendum. Instead, political 
circumstances allowed and sometimes forced both PMs to depict a European identity 
neutrally or negatively in relation to the national identity. This was clear as early as 2013. 
When the British Conservative Party came out low in the election polls, Cameron decided to 
approach Eurosceptic voters by politicising EU migration. He did so by recognizing the 
problems that a high number of migrants posed for the British welfare system. While briefly 
admitting that high-skilled ‘good migrants’ in principal would be welcome in “controlled” 
numbers in his Staffordshire speech, he also depicted migrants as second-class citizens who 
were not allowed upon their arrival to live under the same rights as native Britons. By using 
such discourse, the British population was separated from the Other Europeans. This 
distinction was strengthened by referring to British – and not European –  values such as 
openness and toleration. Ironically, in a rare case where Cameron did refer to a shared 
European history by reminding his audience of what the European founding fathers had in 
mind about migration, this notion was solely made to legitimize stricter migration control. 
When Cameron won the general elections in 2015, he relaxed his language on EU migration, 
and largely avoided the topic altogether.  
May took up the subject of EU migration again as it became an important topic in the Brexit 
negotiations. She generally continued Cameron’s relaxed discourse from 2015. But also 
similarly to Cameron, her tone depended on the political circumstances of when and where 
the addresses were held. In bilateral speeches and those on the continent, she referred to 
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EU migrants as “partners”, “friends”, and even shared herself under “us – the 28 leaders of 
the European Union”. In speeches within the UK however, the EU was depicted somewhat 
more negatively as “Brussels”, separating “a strong, self-governing Global Britain” from “our 
European friends”. But May never securitised EU migrants. While repeatedly admitting that 
the number of migrants should be brought down, she never referred to ‘bad’ or unwanted 
migrants and instead spoke of their “significant contribution[s]”. Furthermore, she 
approached the issue ambiguously by describing migration control as a central interest of 
the British people, while also reiterating her plan to guarantee the rights of EU citizens. The 
reason for her neutral discourse is most likely that taking a hard line on EU migrants would 
have kept the negotiations with the EU hogtied even further (Cooper 2017), while taking a 
soft line would have disappointed a part of the Brexiteers and further confused the weak 
government on the question whether to pursue a hard or soft Brexit (The Economist 2017).  
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5. British discourse on Russia and global Britain 
 
Having discussed and compared the discourse within the migration policy area, this chapter 
will focus on the result of a discourse analysis of texts where foreign policy towards Russia is 
outlined. The analysis is based on 25 transcripts, and is built up similarly to the previous 
chapter. The first section analyses David Cameron’s political language on, based on 15 
documents. The second section studies Theresa May’s discourse on Russia in 10 documents. 
These are then compared for post-Brexit differences in the conclusion. Notable excerpts are 
analysed step-by-step to reveal in the clearest way possible the discursive strategies that 
were used.  
 
5.1 Case study: David Cameron’s discourse on diplomatic action against Russia 
Construction of the international actor 
In Cameron’s discourse on Russia, the EU rather than the UK is constructed as an 
international actor. Perhaps the most clear example of this is found in the transcript of a 
Q&A session in Warrington, in July 2014. The session took place in a time when the anti-EU 
migration sentiment was very high in the UK, as shown in the previous chapter (Ágopcsa 
2017, 24). The speech was held within the UK and in front of a British audience. After a brief 
introduction by Cameron, a member of the audience asked the following question (Cameron 
2014d): 
I’m interested to know what can the British government do to help stop Putin and 
support Ukraine? 
The question was specifically about what the British government could do in response to 
Putin’s aggression in Ukraine. The PM responded and referred to Europe and the EU directly 
nine times. In retrospect, the United Kingdom is mentioned only once. There are also many 
indirect references to Europe and the EU. For instance, the use of “we” and “our” refers to 
the European nations that are part of the EU and NATO, rather than to the UK alone. This is 
visible by the references to “we”, “Belgium”, “Poland”, and “Czechoslovakia” (Ibid.):  
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I think first of all we need to be clear about what it is that’s happening on our 
continent. You know, this year we are commemorating the hundredth anniversary of 
the First World War, and that war, at heart, was about the right of a small country, 
Belgium, not to be trampled on by its neighbours. We had to learn that lesson all over 
again in the Second World War when the same thing happened to Poland, to 
Czechoslovakia and other countries. And, you know, in a way, this is what we’re 
seeing today in Europe. 
If read as an isolated text, these references have little meaning. But compared to Cameron’s 
discourse on migration in the previous chapter, he presents himself differently here. He is 
acting as a European leader, not solely a British one, and is dedicated to protecting the 
continent from a common enemy. The PM does not depict member states of the EU as 
‘Others’. Instead, these member states and the UK are part of a collective: the victors of the 
First World War. This construction of a collective differs from Cameron’s discourse on 
migration, in which the EU and its citizens were represented as Others. Compare the above 
cited paragraph with the following response to a question about how to limit EU migration:  
I think part of our problem has been, because our economy is now growing much 
faster than other European economies, many people are coming from Europe to 
work in Britain, because their economies aren’t creating jobs where our economy is 
creating jobs. 
Economic problems in other European countries are treated as irrelevant to the UK’s 
problems. The only problem for the UK is the migration that results from these economic 
problems. While the economies of European countries obviously differ, so do their military 
and diplomatic power. In fact, the UK was very reluctant in uploading its national foreign 
policy through the EU (David, Gower, and Haukkala 2013, 55–67). Nevertheless, foreign 
policy towards Russia is presented as something that matters to Europe as a whole, while 
the economies are framed as ‘Others’ because bad economies in the other member states 
cause migration to the UK. Such cherry picking of an international actor is done to legitimize 
pursuing a common security strategy (by representing the EU as an international actor) and 
a different migration policy (by representing the UK as an international actor). This is also 
done in a speech at GLOBSEC 2015, where Cameron referred to “our economies” when 
discussing European military strategy (Cameron 2015c).  
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Besides having economic differences, the European continent is also portrayed as something 
different to the British Islands in Cameron’s migration discourse (Cameron 2014f): 
The great majority of those who come here from Europe come to work, work hard, 
and they pay their taxes. (...) They’re willing to travel across the continent in search 
of a better life for them and their families. 
Note how the synecdoches “from” and “the continent” portray Europe as the Other, 
compared to “our continent” in the response to the question about Russian aggression 
(Machin and Mayr 2012, 167–70). 
The EU is constructed as Self by portraying Russia as Other. In the Warrington Q&A, direct 
references to Russia and the Russians were made fourteen times, excluding many indirect 
references. As noted before, Cameron remains almost silent about the UK as an actor, and 
instead speaks of Ukrainian-EU relations (Cameron 2014d): 
Ukraine (…) should have every right to determining its own future and the 
relationships it wants to have in the world, whether with Russia, whether with the 
European Union. 
In other addresses too, it is taken for granted that the EU is the international actor to 
counter the Russian threat in Ukraine, rather than the UK itself. After Russia’s military 
intervention in Ukraine on 18 March 2014, Cameron immediately responded and ranked 
Britain in a broader international order (Cameron 2014a): 
Britain depends on the stability and security of the international order. That relies on 
a rules based system where those who ignore it face consequences. And that’s why 
the EU and the United States have already imposed sanctions.  
A strategy in constructing a common European actor is by grouping it under the 
‘international community’ with the G7. In Cameron’s discourse, Britain does not take action 
against Russia alone, but cooperates with the international community. Take his statements 
to the House of Commons (Cameron 2014b):  
Both the European Council and the G7 leaders made very strong statements 
condemning the illegal referendum and condemning Russia’s illegal attempt to annex 
Crimea in contravention of international law and specific international obligation.  
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Throughout the whole speech, there are many references to the EU institutions and the G7, 
which are then put in the framework of the international community. This international 
community seems to consist of all countries in the world except for Russia (Ibid.): 
Russia’s violation of international law is a challenge to the rule of law around the 
world, and should be a concern for all nations. 
Another strategy in constructing a European actor is by highlighting the importance of the 
EU’s common energy market. While the UK barely depended on Russian gas in 2015, this 
dependence differed enormously per EU member state. Yet Cameron frames a common 
European dependency on Russian gas. While he does admit that the UK has almost no 
reliance on Russian gas, he continues arguing in favour of reducing “Europe’s dependency” 
on energy from Russia (Cameron 2014b). Even in bilateral speeches, such as an address with 
Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, he refers to “Europe’s energy supply”. Reducing energy 
dependence is said to be in the interests of all European countries (Cameron and Renzi 
2014): 
It is in all our interests – whether, frankly, we’re reliant on Russian gas or not, it’s in 
all our interests that all of Europe become less reliant, so we’re a more resilient 
continent  
“We” and “continent” are again linked to a common European actor, and apparently Russia 
is not considered as European as that would revoke its status as the Other actor. Russian 
aggression is a European problem. In some instances, there are even references to “Europe’s 
borders” (Cameron and Fogh Rasmussen 2014; Cameron 2016). Cameron also threatens 
with increased “European pressure” and a blockade to “European markets, European capital, 
European knowledge and technical expertise” if Russia continues to cause conflict in “one of 
Europe’s neighbours” (Cameron 2014c). References to British pressure, markets, capital or 
knowledge and technical expertise are non-existent in the context of Russia discourse.  
Identical references to a Self by speaking of “we” and “our continent” as a reference to the 
EU, Europe or NATO in opposition to the Other “Russia” and “them” were found in all 
studied documents. Even shortly after it was clear that the UK would leave the EU, Cameron 
pledged that Britain would not turn its back on Europe or on European security (Cameron 
2016).  
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However, Britain is not fully absent from references to the international actor. It is often 
represented as a leading actor in the European framework. The first time the its leading role 
was mentioned is in a press conference with Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who was then 
Secretary General of NATO (Cameron and Fogh Rasmussen 2014):  
As 1 of only 4 allies that meet the NATO 2% GDP spending target, we should be 
encouraging fellow members to invest more and do it more smartly.   
The prominence of Britain as an international actor is not limited to NATO references 
(Cameron 2015a): 
We [the British] were the first to call for Russia to be expelled from the G8. We have 
been the strongest proponent of sanctions, and a vital ally in keeping the EU and US 
united.  
References to Britain military and diplomatic power are also omnipresent. These are found 
in the form of references to statistics on its military equipment, its defence budget and its 2 
percent spending commitment to NATO, as well as its position as a serious global diplomatic 
player (Cameron 2015b, 2015c; Cameron and Obama 2016; Cameron 2016). The following 
excerpt frequently returns in other documents through similar language (Cameron 2015c): 
With the second largest defence budget in NATO, and the largest in the EU, Britain is 
investing heavily in modernising the defence of our own nations and our forces 
available to the Atlantic alliance. Over the next 10 years we are spending over €220 
billion on the latest military equipment (…).   
Britain is always in the lead in setting up a European response to international conflict, and is 
the strongest European power. This is especially the case in Cameron’s single speech after 
the Brexit referendum. In it he sometimes refers to “our allies” as separate from the UK, and 
makes eighteen references to “Britain’s commitment” and its leading role. These remarks 
return in a diluted version in all other studied documents, but are always made in an 
addition to the abundant references to European actorness in the context of the 
international order. Europe always acts in unity when it comes to decisions on Russia, with 
Britain playing a very strong role in making these decisions. With this in mind, I will now 
discuss what type of European international actor is constructed.  
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Type of international actor in relation to the other 
The first important notion with regards to the type of international actor is that almost all 
studied documents contain references to a shared history in the form of the Second World 
War (Cameron and Obama 2014; Cameron and Fogh Rasmussen 2014; Cameron 2014c, 
2014e; Cameron and Obama 2015; Cameron 2015c; Cameron and Obama 2016; Cameron 
2016). There are direct references to “European history” in this context (Cameron 2014e). 
Notably, Russia apparently has no place in this history, nor in the lessons learned from the 
war which imply that no borders of a nation should never be changed by violence. Russia’s 
role is neglected, and instead the victors of the Second World War consist of the EU’s 
member states and those of NATO. Cameron admits that these victors have “different 
perspectives” on the Ukrainian situation (Cameron and Renzi 2014). Nevertheless, what 
these nations share is fundamentally the fight against illiberalism and the breach of 
international law. Britain “depends on the stability and security of the international order” 
(Cameron 2014a), the protectors of which consists of the EU and the United States, as 
shown in the previous section. By neglecting Russia’s role in the war and by reminding the 
audience that inaction towards aggression has led to a devastating war in the past, it is 
placed in the role of the aggressor as opposed to the sovereign European nation states.  
The EU is therefore placed in a positive semantic context. It is depicted as a good actor which 
uses peaceful measures to stop Russia’s “unacceptable” military advance in Ukraine (Ibid.):  
So we’ve seen an appalling loss of life, so we have to ask ourselves what more can we 
do? Now, we’re not about to launch a European war, we’re not about to send the 
fleet to the Black Sea, we’re not looking for a military confrontation. But what we 
should do is use the economic power that we have – the European Union and the 
United States of America – to demonstrate to Russia that what Russia is doing is 
unacceptable. 
Cameron speaks of a “European war”, and then refers to “we” as “the European Union and 
the United States of America”. The EU is a metonymy for NATO, because the EU does not 
have a standing army besides some Battlegroups (European Commission n.d.). This widens 
the scope of what European identity means: besides having the ability to act as an economic 
power, Europe’s military is also considered as part of the identity. While I do not argue that 
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the EU and NATO lack cooperation or a common vision, it is clear that Cameron attempts to 
represent the EU as a stronger power than it actually is (Toje 2011).  
The second aspect is of the EU as a righteous international actor, which has set out a “tough, 
consistent and predictable set of measures to send a very clear message to Vladimir Putin.” 
(Cameron and Renzi 2014). Words like “tough”, “consistent”, “predictable”, and “very clear” 
are terms which suggest a high degree of unity and fairness on the side of the EU. Later in 
the speech, it was indeed stated that all EU member states agreed on travel bans and asset 
freezes for Russian government officials. Such a depiction of the EU as a united and 
righteous actor versus a destabilising Russia is found in all the studied documents. The 
following excerpt is just one example. The key player is NATO, which is used as a similar 
word for the EU (Cameron and Fogh Rasmussen 2014): 
We should make clear to Russia that NATO has only ever sought to be her partner not 
a threat. But Russia, by its own ongoing illegal actions in a neighbouring country, and 
threatening behaviour to NATO allies, is preventing such cooperation in the future.  
This Us versus Them strategy is then sometimes used to legitimize the creation of a common 
European energy market, which is according to Cameron “in all our interests – whether, 
frankly, we’re reliant on Russian gas our not (…)” (Cameron and Renzi 2014).  
Ironically, before Russia invaded Ukraine, Cameron emphasized that Russia belonged to the 
international community. In June 2013 during a press conference at Downing Street, 
Cameron said that Britain and Russia shared interests in “trading together (…), keeping our 
people safe at home and abroad, and working to tackle big international problems at the UN 
and, of course, the G8.” (Cameron and Putin 2013). Cameron also refers to the World War 
Two Artic convoys, British vessels which delivered essential supplies to the Soviet Union. He 
uses this historical event to legitimize the fact that while Britain and Russia have always had 
their differences, these can be silenced by forming a powerful partnership. Such a discourse 
is similar to the later discourse on EU member states, which also have had differences but 
share fundamental characteristics as freedom and liberalism. It is notable how Putin’s 
military advance in Ukraine turned Russia from a member of the international community 
and a powerful partner, into an enemy and a non-European state.  
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Values of the international actor in relation to the other  
Because Russia is depicted as a European problem rather than solely a British one, Cameron 
also constructs European values in his discourse. It was already explained in the previous 
section that the EU was part of the international community, as an enforcer of the rule of 
law. This image is then tied to the EU as a de-escalating power (Cameron and Fogh 
Rasmussen 2014). By standing up against an escalating power such as Russia, Europe is 
“standing up for the principles that govern conduct between independent nations (…)” 
(Cameron 2014c). These principles are later defined as “Democracy, freedom of speech, free 
enterprise, equality of opportunity, human rights (…)” (Cameron 2015c). These values unite 
the European nation states, which should be protected together from “Tyranny, fascism, 
hatred” (Ibid.). The EU also believes in the sovereign right of countries to make their own 
decisions (Cameron 2016). In joint addresses with Barack Obama, similar values are used to 
shape an Anglo-Saxon identity in addition to the European identity (Cameron and Obama 
2014, 2015, 2016).  
There are no conflicting values between Britain and the EU found in Cameron’s discourse. 
Only after the Brexit referendum, Cameron referred to a projection of “British power and 
British values” around the world (Cameron 2016), but he does not distinguish these from 
European values. Indeed, he admits that he is not worried about maintaining a strong and 
unified European position, and aims to remain the EU’s most important European partner in 
the areas of security and diplomacy.  
 
5.2 Case Study: Theresa May’s discourse on Russia and Global Britain  
Construction of the international actor 
In her first visit to Germany as a PM, Theresa May immediately made clear that Britain is not 
“walking away from our European friends.” (May and Merkel 2016). She instead constructed 
Britain as an “outward-looking country.” (Ibid.), cooperating with European partners in 
tackling shared challenges they faced. On the Ukrainian situation, May said that Germany 
and the UK have been a strong and united voice around the world, but should also deepen 
their bilateral military partnership (Ibid). For May, the decision of British voters to leave the 
EU is not an obstacle for cooperating internationally, but rather an opportunity to 
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strengthen relationships. While Britain was still a member of the EU at the time of the 
speech, it was already defined as a different entity: 
Together, we should maximise the opportunities for both the UK and the EU.   
The separation of the UK and the EU in May’s language is not very remarkable on its own. 
Even when considering that the UK was still a member of the Union during the speech, it had 
planned on leaving it a little less than two years later. The distinction is therefore used for 
simplicity’s sake, and in other documents May does recognize that the UK is still an EU 
member state for the time being (see e.g. May and Szydło 2016a; May 2016).  
What is remarkable however, is that May used Brexit to construct the UK as an international 
actor that looks further than Europe. She stated that leaving the EU presented an 
opportunity to “strengthen our relations with countries around the world.” (May and Szydło 
2016a). In relation to that, she set out a “new global role for the UK” (May and Obama 
2016). This new global role would not leave its European partners behind in fighting 
common enemies (May and Szydło 2016b). What is new post-Brexit is that relations with 
allies “around the world” will also be improved (Ibid.). The British voters are presented as 
people who want to “embrace the world” (May 2017a).  
The new global role for Britain is defined as “Global Britain” in May’s Plan For Britain speech 
of January 2017, which many EU leaders interpreted as a plan for a hard Brexit (Asthana, 
Stewart, and Elgot 2017). The new role is best illustrated by the following quote (May 
2017a):  
I want this United Kingdom to emerge from this period of change stronger, fairer, 
more united and more outward-looking than ever before. (…). I want us to be a truly 
Global Britain – the best friend and neighbour to our European partners, but a 
country that reaches beyond the borders of Europe too. A country that goes out into 
the world to build relationships with old friends and new allies alike. 
(…) A great, global trading nation that is respected around the world and strong, 
confident and united at home. 
Britain is constructed as an internationalist actor. According to May, its history and culture 
are built on it. This does not undermine its international position as a European country. 
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May admits that the UK is a European country, and proud of its shared European heritage. 
But during her Plan for Britain speech and afterwards, the portrayal of Britain as a global 
nation is frequently used in shaping a new kind of identity. According to May, Britain’s 
internationalist place in the world and the global ties that came with it were restricted by 
the EU. Now that the UK will leave the EU, it can become an independent trading nation. 
This is represented by language such as “going into the wider world and rediscover is role as 
a great, global, trading nation” (Ibid.).  
Global Britain is able to “chart” its own way in the world (May 2017c). This results in a 
somewhat awkward narrative of shared European history. For instance, in her Florence 
speech in September 2017, the beginning of the Renaissance is marked as an historical event 
that defined what it means to be European (a reference to the Second World War would 
obviously have been inappropriate, considering Italy’s diplomatic side in that event). On the 
other hand, the UK never felt truly at home within the EU because the British people “want 
more direct control of decisions that affect their daily lives” (Ibid.) than other member 
states.  
One remarkable difference with the pre-Brexit period is that the Global Britain discourse can 
by shaped by the arbitrariness of the ruling PM, because the UK would no longer have to rely 
on the EU as an international actor. Global Britain is friendly with Europe and the EU on 
matters of safety and security, but only because NATO’s Article 5 forces the UK to do so and 
because Europe’s security is in the national interest (NATO 2017b). On the topic of 
migration, but also other subjects not discussed in this paper such as the future of trade, the 
UK is was described in all documents as a “truly independent, internationalist actor”. It is 
self-governing, but wants to continue to play a leading role in Europe with its outstanding 
capabilities in the military, diplomatic, and security areas (May 2017b). Notably, in a bilateral 
speech Poland is praised as an international actor alongside Britain (May and Szydło 
2016a)7: 
Britain and Poland are leading players in NATO (…). Poland has played a leading role 
in international efforts to secure peace and stability (…).  
                                                          
7 Poland increased its military spending from 2014 onwards as a response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. It 
reached NATO’s minimum threshold of 2 percent GDP spending in 2015. See (NATO 2017a).  
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The second difference is that there were no references to a common European energy 
market in all studied documents. This is an EU policy and part of the internal market. May 
repeatedly admitted that the UK did not want to stay a member of the Single Market (May 
2017a, 2017c), and therefore lost a useful reference previously used by Cameron to 
construct a common European identity.  
 
Type of international actor in relation to the other 
May’s discourse on the type of international actor is rather similar to Cameron’s. Firstly, 
Global Britain wants to keep tackling shared European security challenges by building a 
positive relationship (May and Merkel 2016). The Second World War is frequently used as a 
reason why European nations should work together military-wise. In line with this, Russia is 
framed as a common threat to Europe, “our continent” (May 2017c) that includes Britain 
and should be protected together. Allies are represented as good actors, for instance the 
“Polish pilots alongside us in World War 2” (May and Szydło 2016a). She also speaks of 
protecting “our citizens” against hostile threats, referring to all European citizens (May 
2017a). The Us versus Them strategy is therefore roughly the same as in Cameron’s 
discourse, in which Us means Europe with Britain as a leading nation, while Them means 
Putin’s Russia.  
Secondly, Britain and its allies are righteous actors who stand up for “freedom and 
democracy across Europe” (May and Szydło 2016a). They provide security in Europe and 
around the world (May and Szydło 2016b), and the UK will remain committed to its leading 
role in maintaining European security even as it leaves the EU (May 2016). This follows from 
the fact that a common European security strategy is in the national interests of the UK, in 
opposition to a common European immigration policy. The distinction becomes especially 
clear in the following excerpts (Ibid.):  
[I want] A deal that will deliver the deepest possible co-operation to ensure our 
national security and the security of our allies. 
But [I also want] a deal that will mean when it comes to decision about our national 
interest, such as how we control immigration, we can make these decision for 
ourselves.  
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Values of the international actor in relation to the other  
Global Britain largely shares the same values as European nations. In almost all of the 
studied documents, there were references to common values in the context of common 
security. These are liberty, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and freedom. Such 
values should be protected from hostile aggressors, a group which includes Russia. The kind 
of values and the need to protect these together is very similar to Cameron’s pre-Brexit 
discourse. References to a shared history are often made in bilateral speeches (May and 
Szydło 2016b; May 2017a, 2017c).  
Some differences in values appear in May’s Plan for Britain and Florence speech. She 
distinguishes Global Britain’s history and culture as “profoundly internationalist”, recognizing 
it as a European country but also one that is independent (Ibid.). The Brexit referendum was 
not a decision to retreat from Europe, but rather to live up to internationalist values and 
build on Britain’s global culture. Britain’s place in the EU came at the expense of these 
values, and limited an ambitious willingness to trade with the wider world. Furthermore, 
Britain’s political traditions are different in that the UK has no written constitution, has little 
experience with coalition government, and has a population which expects to be able to 
hold their government accountable very directly. These characteristics are not absent in 
other European nations, but they are constricted by the EU (Ibid.).   
Nevertheless, May says that the decision to leave the EU was “no rejection of the values we 
share.” (May 2017a). The UK would always stand by and defend these values (May 2017c). 
References to shared values are not exclusive to common security threats. However, they 
were used by far most often in these contours. In her Florence speech for instance, May 
made nine references to common European values when speaking about security 
challenges. The other five were used in general discourse of a “new partnership”, and only 
one in the context of trade relations (Ibid.).  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that British discourse on Russia was thoroughly Europeanized before 
the Brexit referendum, and took a more internationalised turn after the vote. Cameron 
referred to Europe, the EU and NATO in his addresses on Russia’s aggression in Eastern 
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Europe in all studied documents. The term ‘Europe’ was often used as a synonym for Britain 
and the EU or NATO, acting as a collective against Russia. Cameron constructed a European 
identity by emphasizing the need of a common European Energy Market, which he deemed 
to be in the interest of all European nations. Furthermore, he referred to a common 
European history based on World War Two, and to European values such as democracy, 
freedom of speech, free enterprise, equality of opportunity, human rights. Britain as an actor 
was not wholly absent however, and was often depicted as a strong, leading player in the 
international world order.  
May adopted a roughly similar discourse. Most of the same European values were used, and 
it was recognized that although Britain was now leaving the EU, it would not leave Europe 
and would still stand by its “European allies” (May 2017a). An important difference with the 
pre-Brexit period is the construction of Britain as a fundamentally Global Britain. While 
emphasizing that Britain is a European country, proud of a shared European heritage, it is 
also a country that has always looked beyond Europe and into to the wider world. British 
history and culture are also built on this, with May claiming that these are “profoundly 
internationalist” (Ibid.). Not neglecting the threat of Russia, May legitimized weak de-
Europeanization by arguing that the UK’s place in the EU came at the expense of its global 
ties. Not neglecting Britain’s shared European values, it was also imaged as having a more 
outward-looking culture and history, and as a strong and global actor.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
The main question of this paper was how David Cameron and Theresa May de-Europeanized 
the national identity through their discourse before and after the Brexit referendum. In 
previous conclusions, it became evident that both PMs generally used the topic of EU 
migration to de-Europeanize the national identity. In the most neutral form, they did so by 
depicting migrants as “European friends”, and in the most negative form by presenting them 
as undeserving, second-class citizens. In the case of common threats, Cameron used the 
Russian threat to enhance a British-European identity, which coincided with a British-
internationalist identity under May. In both topics, there was no stable trend of de-
Europeanization since the announcement of the Brexit referendum. Instead, a European 
identity was deconstructed when it was politically clever to do so. Cameron did so by 
securitising EU migrants when his party was weak in the polls, and May did so by 
constructing a handy alternative identity with Global Britain: a self-governing country, 
committing to each European policy if it served the “national interests”.  
Although there were no fundamental differences in the degree of de-Europeanization within 
the discourse topics, the constructivist approach revealed major differences between the 
two policy areas. Both PMs made almost no references to common European values or 
history when speaking about EU migration to the UK. However, such references were 
overabundant in discourse on Russia, and the PMs often constructed Britain and Europe as 
the same actors. Europe became a different continent belonging to a group of Others when 
speaking about EU migration, yet Britain was framed as a part of that same continent when 
security threats were high.  
Cameron’s and May’s discourse is likely to have had a profound impact on the public opinion 
(Hansen 2006, 82–87). Negative language on EU migration allowed Euroscepticism to 
overshadow the British political debate even further (The Economist 2016; Wheatcroft 
2016), separating the British Us with their own values and culture versus the European 
Other. On the other hand, positive language on European culture and history that was 
adopted when the continent faced a common threat, paved the way for a positive public 
view on security cooperation. Indeed, a large majority of the British population still had a 
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favourable view of NATO after the Brexit referendum, the number of which was comparable 
to 2009 levels (Stokes 2017). Against the argument that continued references to a European 
identity in relation to security threats made sense as the UK never planned on leaving NATO, 
I argue that migrants were already securitized before the Brexit referendum took place. This 
link between de-Europeanization and public opinion demonstrates the need to not treat 
Europeanisation exclusively in policy terms, but also look at how discourses can enable 
certain ‘anti-EU’ policies (Aydın-Düzgit 2016, 56).  
 
6.1 Shortcomings and limitations   
A shortcoming of this research is how the British public exactly conceived the discourse of 
both PMs. While this impact is expected to be high considering that PMs have a high political 
authority and can reach a wide audience because of their easy access to media platforms 
(Hansen 2006, 82–87), detailed information of how the public conceived speeches and 
statements remains unclear. In line with this, treating discourse as a concept that constitutes 
the identity of Britain and the EU on which foreign policies are based is problematic. It 
overrates the importance and stability of discourse, and is based upon the idea that 
language plays a key role in the power politics and the social order (Diez 2014, 330). Further 
research could examine to what extent foreign policy discourse precisely affects the feeling 
of identity among the audience. A critical side note to this, is that no discourse analysis can 
provide concluding evidence of what people think (Schneider 2013c). 
Other shortcomings could arguably be the amount of documents used in this paper, and the 
lack of clarification of what the writers had in mind when writing speeches and statements 
for their PMs. Although the chapters above explained the discourse in 25 documents, these 
are obviously not representative of how Cameron and May used language in the time span 
of more than 4 years. It should be noted, however, that the studied documents and 
secondary literature contained at least all major speeches of both PMs in the categories of 
EU migration and Russia. These documents therefore provide at least an accurate overview 
of what discourse was generally used. With regards to what the writers of the transcripts 
had in mind, it must be understood that this was not a relevant topic in the context of how 
both PMs de-Europeanized British identity through their discourse. However, conducting a 
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research into how writers frame speeches and statements would certainly be interesting on 
its own, and could reveal how they are able to influence the political stance of their PMs.  
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